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The question that this paper addresses is 
whether age discrimination laws are justified for 
the protection of older workers from a societal and 
economic point of view.  An analysis of the 
congressional intent in enacting the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and a 
brief review of significant court interpretations of 
the ADEA provides initial insight into the 
legislative objectives and the unique problems that 
older persons face in the workforce.  Both the 
positive and negative impacts of the ADEA on 
older workers and cost efficiency objectives of 
employers are evaluated.  Despite certain of its 
limitations in protecting older workers and  
increase in costs to employers, the enactment of 
the ADEA has been instrumental in initiating 
policies that address the changing demographic of 
an aging workforce and prompting a 
transformation in human resource practices 
towards older workers.     
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The ADEA states as its objective in broad 
terms:  to promote the employment of older 
persons based on their ability rather than age; to 
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in 
employment; to help employers and workers find 
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact 
of age on employment.1  Whether the ADEA is 
effective in meeting its objectives is unsettled.   
The longstanding problem with anti-age 
discrimination legislation, including the ADEA, is 
that the enforcement mechanisms typically bear 
little consequence to the violator.  While pre-
ADEA laws lacked any administrative procedures 
to uphold policies, the ADEA is enforced through 
the Equal Opportunities Employment 
Commission, as are Title VII violations.  
However, the damages to an employer for 
violating the ADEA are slight compared to other 
discrimination violations.  Furthermore, injunctive 
                                                 
1 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. 
relief in which the older worker is rehired is not a 
desirable remedy for the typical worker who has 
resorted to filing a claim against their employer.    
Legislative History  
Age discrimination legislation at the federal 
level has a history that precedes the enactment of 
the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA)2.  In 1956, the United States Civil Service 
Commission “abolished maximum ages of entry 
into employment…eliminating age discrimination 
in hiring in federal employment” (Neumark, 
March 2001:2).   Executive Order No. 11141 
issued in 1964 established a policy that prohibited 
age discrimination in the employment of federal 
contractors.  (Neumark, March 2001:2).  Congress 
enacted the Older Americans Act in 1965 which 
“was designed to encourage research and 
programs to aid the aged, but also stated among its 
general objectives ‘the opportunity for 
employment with no discriminatory personnel 
practices because of age’” (Neumark, March 
2001:2).   The problem with these executive and 
congressional initiatives is that they failed to 
establish administrative procedures for upholding 
their polices, rendering them ineffective. 
(Neumark, March 2001). 
At the state level, legislative prohibitions 
against age discrimination were enacted as early as 
1903 (Neumark & Stock, July 1997), and began to 
parallel the later federal legislation beginning in 
the 1930’s (Neumark, March 2001).  State laws 
that included anti-age discrimination provisions 
were commonly part of the fair employment 
practices legislation, with a civil rights 
commission or labor department that had powers 
of conciliation and enforcement (Neumark et al., 
July 1997).  Those state laws without any 
enforcement provisions had little or no impact. 
The ADEA was enacted by Congress in 1967 
in the wake of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
                                                 
2 Ibid.   
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1964 (Title VII)3, which prohibits employment 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.  The ADEA has many parallels 
with Title VII: it defines as illegal many of the 
same activities (Neumark, March 2001); and, it is 
enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission.  However, as highlighted by 
Neumark (2001, pp. 5-6), there are differences 
regarding the treatment of age in the labor market: 
“[T]he ADEA recognizes the role of seniority 
systems, and as such protects the use of a bona 
fide seniority system, as long as it is not used to 
evade the purposes of the Act.  It also recognizes 
that some work limitations may arise with age, and 
hence permits the use of age as a bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ) that is 
‘reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a 
business’.  Finally, it recognizes that cost related 
to benefits may be higher for older workers, and 
makes some allowances for this; in particular, an 
employer can offer younger and older workers 
benefits that cost the same, even if the actual 
benefit to the older worker is less.” 
Differential treatment based on age, as 
compared with race and sex, is typically derived 
from negative stereotypes of older workers  
(Crawshaw-Lewis, 1996);  whereas the basis for 
Title VII protections is largely to combat hostile 
intentional discrimination based on prejudice or 
bias.  The record of the debate over the ADEA 
from the Congressional Record, as cited by 
Crawshaw-Lewis (1996, p. 770), underscores the 
point:  “The bill recognizes two distinct types of 
unfair discrimination based on age:  First, the 
discrimination which is the result of 
misunderstanding of the relationship of age to 
usefulness; and second, the discrimination which 
is a result of a deliberate disregard of a worker’s 
value solely because of age.”   In addition, 
“Congress found that setting arbitrary age limits 
without regard to potential for job performance 
was common and that unemployment with 
attendant deterioration in skills and moral was 
higher for older workers as compared to those who 
are younger” (Donald J. Spero, 2004).   
 The ADEA has undergone significant 
amendments since its original enactment.  In 1978, 
the ADEA was amended to raise the age 
                                                 
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. 
protection limit from ages forty (40) through sixty-
five (65), to age seventy (70).  This amendment 
also resulted in raising the mandatory retirement 
age to seventy (70), with certain exceptions 
(Neumark, March 2001).  The ADEA was later 
amended in 1986 to eliminate the age cap, which 
resulted in the prohibition of mandatory 
retirement.  
Once mandatory retirement was disallowed by 
the 1986 amendment, employers turned to 
financial inducements for workers to retire, which 
led to the enactment of the  1990 Older Workers 
Protection Act (OWBPS)4 (Neumark, March 
2001).  The OWBPS      prohibits discrimination 
with respect to employee benefits on the basis of 
age and regulates early retirement incentive 
programs.  Under the OWBPA, employees eligible 
for early retirement incentive plans must be 
provided with complete and accurate information 
concerning what benefits are available under the 
plan. The OWBPS also insures that workers are 
not compelled or pressured to waive their rights 
under the ADEA. If certain conditions of the 
OWBPA are met, employees may legally sign 
waivers of their ADEA rights to sue for age 
discrimination (Alexander Hamilton Institute, 
2005)  The federal courts have found releases 
invalid which have not provided the ages of both 
those who have been terminated and those who 
have been retained, so that workers can determine 
whether they would have an age discrimination 
claim (McMorris, 1998). 
Judicial Interpretation of the ADEA 
Under the ADEA, an employee can establish a 
claim for protection against discrimination on the 
basis of age by proving: first, that the employee is 
a member of the protected class (i.e. over forty 
[40] years of age); second, that the employee is 
qualified to do the job; third, that the employee 
was subject to adverse employment action; and 
fourth, that the employee was replaced by a person 
outside the age group.   
In order to meet their burden of proof, an 
employee must present evidence that the employer 
intentionally treated the employee less favorable 
because of age.  This theory of recovery under the 
                                                 
4 Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (effective October 
16, 1990) 
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ADEA is known as “disparate treatment.” 5   Age 
discrimination may be proven through direct 
evidence, for example, a disparaging remark from 
an employer that an employee is “too old.”   It 
may also be proven through circumstantial 
evidence by which indirect evidence of 
discrimination is established by inference of 
certain fact from another, without direct proof.     
Assuming an employee meets their burden of 
proof, the burden shifts to the employer to 
articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the 
adverse action.  The employer is not obligated to 
prove the non-discriminatory intent, but merely to 
state it.  The reason may be based on mistaken 
belief, a poor reason, or no reason at all.  If the 
employer articulates a non-discriminatory reason 
in good faith, it is sufficient to rebut the 
employee’s principle case. 
In the event of a rebuttal, the burden switches 
back to the employee to demonstrate that the 
reason articulated for the employer’s adverse 
action is merely a pretext for discrimination.  The 
employee may meet their proof by showing that 
the employer’s reason is not believable, or that 
people outside the protected age group (less than 
forty [40] years of age), were treated more 
favorably under like circumstances.   
In Title VII actions alleging employment 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin, the United States Supreme 
Court, in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
(1971)6, established a theory of recovery known as 
“disparate impact.”  In order to prove “disparate 
impact”, it is not necessary for the employee to 
prove that its employer intentionally discriminated 
based on age.  Rather discrimination under this 
theory of recover requires:  “first, that an 
employer’s policy that may appear neutral in fact 
impacts older individuals more adversely; and 
second, that the practice cannot be justified by 
‘business necessity’” (Starkman, 1992).   
“Disparate impact” is most commonly established 
through statistical evidence that demonstrates a 
pattern of discrimination on the basis of age. 
                                                 
5 See International Board of Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324 (1977) 
6 401 U. S. 424 (1971) 
 The recent United States Supreme Court 
case of Smith, et al. v. City of Jackson (2005)7 
addressed an issue on which the federal courts had 
been divided, namely, whether the “disparate 
impact” theory of recovery announced in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co. (1971), for cases brought under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is 
cognizable under the ADEA.8   The Smith Court 
held as follows:  “The ADEA authorizes recovery 
in disparate-impact cases comparable to Griggs… 
Except for the substitution of ‘age’” for ‘race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin,’ the 
language of ADEA §4(a)(2) and Title VII 
§703(a)(2) is identical. Unlike Title VII, however, 
ADEA §4(f)(1) significantly narrows its coverage 
by permitting any ‘otherwise prohibited’ action 
‘where the differentiation is based on reasonable 
factors other than age’ (hereinafter RFOA 
provision).”9   
Justice Stevens who wrote the Smith decision 
disputed the suggestion of Justice O’Connor that 
the RFOA provision is a “safe harbor from 
liability.”10  Citing the case of Teamsters v. United 
States (1977)11,  Justice Stevens emphasized that 
“claims that stress ‘disparate impact’ involve 
employment practices that are facially neutral in 
their treatment of difference groups but that in fact 
fall more harshly on one group than another….”  
Justice Stevens concluded accordingly that it is “in 
cases involving disparate-impact claims that the 
RFOA provision plays its principal role by 
precluding liability if the adverse impact was 
attributable to a nonage factor that was 
‘reasonable.’”12   Stevens further notes that “if 
Congress intended to prohibit all disparate-impact 
claims, it certainly would have do so….The fact 
that Congress provided that employees could use 
only reasonable factors in defending a suit under 
the ADEA is therefore instructive.”13   
In an earlier decision, Hazen Paper Co. v. 
Biggins (1993),14 the United States Supreme Court 
“on the one hand noted that the ADEA was 
                                                 
7 544 U. S.____ (2005) 
8 Smith, No. 03—1160, p. 1 
9 Ibid. at p. 2-4  
10 Ibid. at p. 10   
11 431 U. S. 324, 335-336, n.15 (1977) 
12 Smith at p. 10 
13 Ibid. at p. 10, n.11   
14 507 U. S. 604 (1993) 
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concerned with employment decisions based on 
age stereotyping, but on the other hand allowed 
decisions to be based on factors like seniority that 
may be strongly correlated with (but analytically 
distinct from) age, instructing lower courts to look 
for evidence of whether age actually motivated the 
decision ” (Neumark, March 2001:11) (Crawshaw-
Lewis, 1996).  According to Crawshaw-Lewis 
(1996, p. 781), “since Hazen, the courts have been 
much less favorable to age discrimination 
disparate impact claims based on the argument 
that an employer’s decision was motivated by the 
higher salary of an older worker, with some courts 
ruling that firing employees based on high 
compensation stemming from seniority does not 
violate the ADEA” (Neumark, March 2001:11-
12).   
IMPACT OF ADEA ON OLDER WORKERS 
The ADEA has improved the relevant 
employment opportunities for older workers and 
reduced their retirement.  However, aggrieved 
older employees face a difficult burden in proving 
age discrimination because of the “reasonable 
factor other than age” defense available to 
employers under the ADEA, which does not exist 
as a defense under Title VII actions.  Even if an 
employee is successful in proving age 
discrimination, the damages are generally small, 
providing limited disincentives for employers to 
address human resource policies that negatively 
impact older workers.    
Pre-ADEA 
Prior to the enactment of the ADEA, “general 
unemployment rates were highest for the youngest 
part of the population;” however, “there were also 
some indications that older workers who lost their 
jobs had a more difficult time finding new jobs 
than did ‘prime age’ workers” (Neumark, March 
2001:13)  Researchers have also determined that 
the durations of unemployment were also longer 
for older workers (Neumark, March 2001).   
Moreover, the figures used to establish such 
theories have been noted to be understated because 
older workers who were unable to find 
employment were more likely to leave the 
workforce altogether, and thus avoid being 
counted as “unemployed.” (Neumark, March 
2001). 
In addition, restrictions in hiring significantly 
deterred the employment of older workers.  
According to surveys conducted in New York 
between the years 1957 and 1958, forty-two (42%) 
percent of firms had maximum age restrictions of 
fifty (50) years of age for new hires (Neumark, 
March 2001:16).   Similarly, a United States 
Department of Labor study conducted in 1965 
determined that among the states that did not have 
discrimination statutes, nearly sixty (60) percent 
imposed upper age limits within the range of forty-
five and fifty (45-50) year  of age (Neumark, 
March 2001:16).  These figures dispute claims that 
both higher and longer unemployment rates among 
older workers did not solely result from worker 
choice (Neumark, March 2001:14).       
Enactment of the ADEA 
Although the ADEA was enacted only a few 
years after the anti-discrimination laws of Title 
VII, and was similar in its objectives and 
enforcement provisions, age discrimination was 
perceived differently.   As Neumark (March 
2001:18) notes, “animus towards older workers 
was not the view of the original Department of 
Labor report (U.S. Department of Labor, 1965) 
arguing for passage of the ADEA, and it seems 
difficult to view age discrimination in the same 
light as race discrimination, for which we have a 
well-document history of animus.”   It was further 
observed that “the kind of ‘we-they’ thinking that 
foster racial, ethnic, and sexual discrimination is 
unlikely to play a role in the treatment of older 
workers” (Posner, 1995), “because the people who 
make the firing and hiring decisions are often 
older workers” (Neumark, March 2001:18).        
Researchers have frequently observed that age 
discrimination is rooted more in stereotype than it 
is in animus.  Those who have conducted studies 
in the field of industrial gerontology have explored 
“the effects of aging on productivity and 
supervisor appraisals (which could reflect 
stereotypes), and found evidence of productivity 
either holding steady or declining slightly” 
(Neumark, March 2001:19).  Neumark  (March 
2001:19) further states that other evidence points 
to vision, hearing, ease of memorization, and 
computational speed, for example, but that there is 
an offset:  “aging is associated with declines in 
creativity but increases in leadership and abilities.”    
Schmidt Labor Research Center Seminar Research Series 5
Neumark  (March 2001:19) surmises that “with 
the evidence suggesting that many differences 
between older and younger workers are largely 
non-existent or small, negative stereotypes about 
older workers and classifications based on them 
seem likely to act-at least sometimes-in an 
arbitrary fashion, harming many productive 
workers.”   
In addition to improving the overall 
employment opportunities for older workers and 
reducing their retirement, the ADEA has had the 
predominant effect of reducing the likelihood that 
firms renege on long-term relationships between 
workers and firms”  (Neumark, March, 2001:35).   
By comparison, consider that in the United 
Kingdom where there are no laws prohibiting 
discrimination on basis of age there is “evidence 
of persistent and widespread discrimination 
against older workers in both the private and 
public sectors” (Chiu, Chan, Snape, & Redman, 
2001)   
The federal courts have upheld the objectives 
of the ADEA in matters concerning pensions and 
hiring practices.  The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided that an employer sponsored 
health plans that provided different benefits for 
Medicare-eligible retirees younger than age 65 
violated ADEA 15 (Employee Benefit Plan 
Review, 2000).  Moreover, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals in the seminal case of Taggart v. 
Time Incorporated16 determined that “declining to 
hire an older person for being ‘overqualified’ can 
be grounds for an age discrimination suit.”  
According to Target court, “such a reason may 
often be  simply a code word for too old”  
(Lambert & Hayes, 1991)   Lambert & Hayes 
(1992:2) include the quotation of a lawyer who 
defends against age discrimination who sneered 
that “over-qualification” is simply a “buzzword for    
‘we’ll have to pay him too much’”.  Even the 
Target court made the common sense query: 
“How can a person overqualified by experience 
and training be turned down for a position given to 
a younger person deemed better qualified?”  
Despite the court ruling in Target, it is important 
to note that  “the ADEA does not prohibit 
employers from using ‘overqualified’ as a negative 
                                                 
15 See Lavia v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et. 
(No. 99-3863), Third Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals 
16 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991) 
criterion in personnel actions-as long as it has a 
performance related basis” (Kandel, 1991). 
Barriers to ADEA Protections   
Citing the work of Posner (1995, Ch. 13), 
Neumark (March, 2001:30) sets forth the 
argument that the ADEA acts to reduce hiring of 
older workers for two reasons: “first …the costs of 
hiring these workers are increased as a result of 
their new legal rights under the ADEA;” and, 
“second, because damages in hiring discrimination 
cases are likely to be small, while injunctive relief-
hiring the older worker who has filed a claim- is 
unlikely to be attractive the plaintiff, legal action 
is unlikely to be effective in increasing hiring of 
older workers.”   
In addition, ADEA cases are difficult to prove 
for older workers.  The “reasonable factor other 
than age” defense available to employers makes 
any discriminatory treatment of older workers 
difficult to prove, short of an overt disparaging 
remark. Most employers are educated enough not 
to make that obvious mistake.   
Recent studies and reports on the status of age 
discrimination in employment are not 
encouraging.  The executives of ExecuNet, a 
career networking job search engine found that 
“eighty-two (82%) percent of those surveyed 
consider age bias a ‘serious problem’ in today’s 
workplace, up from seventy-eight (78%) percent 
in 2001” (Fischer, 2004:1)   A report on NASA 
noted similarly discouraging outcomes:  “age 
discrimination…seems to be endemic to the entire 
aerospace industry (Khol, 2003:2).  NASA has 
informed unsuccessful older candidates that 
NASA is trying to fill its positions with people 
who are ‘fresh out,’ meaning fresh out of college” 
(Khol, 2003:2).  Khol (2003:3) comments that 
aside from being illegal, these actions shed light 
on why “NASA is losing technological 
competency.”   
IMPACT ON COST EFFICIENCY 
OBJECTIVES OF EMPLOYERS 
The research conclusions about the impact of 
the ADEA on cost efficiency objectives of 
employers are varied.  Neumark & Stock (1997:1), 
in their analysis of the work of Lazear (1979, 
1981), dispute his conclusion that age 
discrimination laws limit the use of long-term 
incentive contracts (“Lazear contracts”) and 
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reduce efficiency.  Other researchers conclude that 
the ADEA was never intended to negatively 
impact cost efficiency and that the courts have 
upheld the determination.  Still others claim that 
the ADEA is tantamount to “rent-seeking”, 
meaning that it provides and unjustifiable 
“windfall” to older workers. 
Lazear Contracts 
The term “Lazear Contracts,” which are long 
term incentive contracts, are derived from the 
influential research of Lazear (1979, 1981) 
(Neumark & Stock, 1997:1).   In 1979, Lazear 
created a model of efficient long-term incentive 
contracts in which employers impose involuntary 
retirement based on age.  Age discrimination laws, 
which bar involuntary terminations based on age, 
discourage the use of such contracts and reduce 
efficiency.   Citing the work of Lazear 
(1979:1283-84), Neumark & Stock, 1997:1) note 
his argument that “…because the wage of older 
workers exceeds their reservation wage, an 
implication of eliminating the ability of firms to 
use involuntary retirement based on age is that 
‘current older workers will enjoy a small one-and-
for-all gain at the expense of a much larger and 
continuing efficiency loss that affects all workers 
and firms adversely.’”   
The analysis of Neumark & Stock (1997:1) 
resulted in their reaching the conclusion that the 
implications of age discrimination laws in 
Lazear’s model have little impact.  First, “not all 
pension plans encourage early retirement, firms 
have remained able to offer financial incentives 
that induce retirement at specific ages;” and 
second, “mandatory retirement per se was 
generally unimportant in inducing retirement for 
all but a small percentage of workers” (Neumark 
& Stock, 1997:5-6).   
Moreover, the “laws…serve as a pre-
commitment device that makes credible the long-
term commitment to workers that firms must make 
under long-term incentive contracts, by making it 
costly for firms to dismiss older workers to whom 
payments in excess of current marginal product 
are owed (Neumark & Stock, 1997: 43).   
Neumark & Stock (1997:43-44) explain that 
“forcing workers to retire at some point (in 
Lazear’s model, when the present values of the 
streams of wages and marginal products are equal) 
may appear to be made more difficult if mandatory 
retirement is prohibited, but under the ADEA 
firms retain the ability to offer strong financial 
incentives to encourage retirement at any age they 
choose.”  Consequently, Neumark & Stock 
(1997:44) explain that “this alternative perspective 
suggests that the predominant effect of the ADEA 
and other age discrimination laws may have been 
to strengthen the bonds between workers and 
firms, thus enabling greater use of Lazear 
contracts.”  The result is to “…boost the 
employment of order workers, while having 
essentially no effect on employment of younger, 
unprotected workers” (Neumark & Stock, 1997: 
44).   Accordingly, “…age discrimination laws 
lead to steeper age-earnings profiles in the labor 
market….increasing rather than decreasing labor 
market efficiency” (Neumark & Stock, 1997:44).    
Cost Efficiency Not in Jeopardy 
The federal courts have held that replacing 
older workers for economic reasons does not 
violate the ADEA.   Some argue that such 
consistent court rulings in favor of economic 
incentives indicate that the ADEA was never 
intended to jeopardize the cost-efficiency of 
business. (HR Focus, 1997).  Others have 
emphasized the corporate rationale for keeping 
older workers on the payroll, which is pure 
economics:  “…keeping an employee on payroll 
saves companies money because they don’t have 
to pay out pensions later” (Capowski, 1994).   
Additionally, the most effective way to avoid costs 
related to the ADEA violations is for employer to 
be “cautious and ensure that legitimate work-
related reasons exist for ending and employee’s 
employment”  (Zall, 2000:40). 
High Costs to Employers   
The most commonly cited arguments against 
age discrimination laws are that they increase 
employer costs because of the higher likelihood of 
illness and death among older workers, and the 
higher costs of health insurance and life insurance.  
In addition, employers argue that when older 
workers are trained, there is less time to recoup 
from that investment in human capital.  (Neumark, 
March 2001).   
The more controversial argument against age 
discrimination laws is that they provide essentially 
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a “windfall” to older workers.  Among the theories 
of Lazear (1979: 1283-4) is the premise that 
“…current older workers will enjoy a small once-
and-for-all gain at the expense of a much larger 
and continuing efficiency loss that affects all 
workers and firms adversely. (Neumark, March 
2001)   
Similarly, some are critical that the “entire 
structure of anti-age discrimination legislation 
reflects “rent-seeking” behavior on the part of 
older workers” (Issacharoff and Worth Harris, 
1997:796).  According to this theory, it is argued 
that Congress, in passing the ADEA, intended to 
protect older workers from maximum age limits 
for new hires, but the typical plaintiff is seeking 
redress over dismissal.  (Neumark, March 2001: 
32). As a result, the “ADEA is form of protection 
against wrongful discharge of older white males” 
(Neumark, March 2001). 
THE ADEA AND HUMAN RESOURCE 
PRACTICES 
Capowski (1994:1) cautioned ten years ago 
that “workers 55 and older are the fastest growing 
segment of the workforce, with the median age of 
the workforce projected to reach 40 by 2010.”  
How to deal with this phenomenon is the 
fundamental question that employers need to 
address.  (Capowski, 1994:1).  First and foremost, 
it is imperative that employers have a grasp on 
how their ingrained personnel policies, as well as 
their personal stereotypes, may ultimately 
sabotage human resource objectives.  In the 
absence of change, it may be difficult for 
employers to meet their objective of gathering and 
sustaining a competent, productive and committed 
workforce.  Similarly, older workers attempting to 
remain in the workforce or reenter to need to have 
a clear appreciation of what makes a candidate 
competitive in today’s changing workforce. 
Overcome Stereotypes  
In 1997, a study was conducted by Rosen and 
Jerdee in which they used various hypothetical 
scenarios to evaluate the personnel decisions of 
managers.  As a result of this study Rosen and 
Jerdee (1997) concluded that:  “first, managers 
perceive older workers as less flexible and more 
resistant to change; second, managers are less 
inclined to provide support for career development 
and training of older workers; and, third, 
promotion opportunities for older workers are 
more likely to be restricted in jobs requiring 
flexibility, creativity, and high motivation” 
(Neumark, March 2001). 
Certain researches found a “negative 
relationship between employee age and the 
performance ratings they received from their 
supervisors…despite the fact that systematic 
difference in performance between workers 
involved in the study did not seem to exist” (Ferris 
& King, 1992).  Ferris and King (1992:7) found 
that the potential explanation for what may appear 
to be intentional age discrimination in evaluation 
is that “older people behave less politically and 
thus receive lower performance ratings than 
younger people in the same job.”  The real issue is 
not one of competence or ability, but rather the 
reality that “older employees receive lower 
performance ratings because they are less effective 
(or willing to try) at manipulating how the 
supervisor likes them” (Ferris & King, 1992:7). 
Consider Alternative Employment 
Arrangements 
Capwoski (1994:2-3) emphasizes the 
importance of establishing policies that are 
flexible and accommodate a changing diverse 
work force, especially with older workers.  In 
support of employing older workers, studies have 
shown that the capacity to learn continues into 70s 
and beyond for most people. (Capwoski, 1994:3).  
Capwoski (1994:3) cites the employment policies 
of McDonalds which have encouraged older 
workers, recognizing that the shortage of younger 
workers was a bad demographic trend.  
McDonald’s took a “proactive approach and 
instituted McMaster’s program, a formal 
recruitment and training program” (Capwoski, 
1994:3).   While the McMaster’s program is no 
longer officially in place, “more than 40,000 
seniors work in McDonald’s around world” 
(Capwoski, 1994:3).   McDonald’s has found that 
its older workers are very dependable and 
committed; seniors and young employees work 
well together; and, seniors act as mentors. 
(Capwoski, 1994).  
According to certain theorists, age 
discrimination is the direct neglect by employers 
to maintain and support workers who are [over 
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forty (40)]. (Martinez & Kleiner, 1993).  
Employers are encouraged to develop objective 
standards of employment for all workers, and 
break the mindset that retirees can only help fill 
unskilled positions. (Martinez & Kleiner, 1993:5).    
Moreover, it is economically beneficial for 
employers to consider alternative work options 
such as, “part-time, consulting, reduced pay, job 
sharing, compressed work week, and job rotation.” 
(Martinez & Kleiner, 1993:5).   Losing an older 
experienced workforce often ends up being 
expensive.  The costs include “replacement costs, 
retraining costs and downtime following layoffs;” 
and, in addition, “companies forfeit experience, 
expertise, commitment, loyalty, maturity and 
productivity of a growing group of workers” 
(Martinez & Kleiner, 1993:4).  Employers need to 
adopt polices that encourage flexibility, include 
tapering off programs and a reduction of hours that 
eases older workers into the retirement process. 
(Martinez & Kleiner, 1993:5).  The key is for 
employers to adapt to “look at workers as 
individuals, not older” and “manage based on 
capabilities and performance” (Martinez & 
Kleiner, 1993:4).        
Recognize the Changing Workplace 
Older workers have at their disposal certain 
strategies to held overcome age discrimination.  In 
order to combat age bias, it is recommended that 
older workers  “go into an interview with detailed 
research showing that you understand the 
business, the challenges it faces, and what 
problems need solving; interviewers will tend to 
look past your age and focus on your ideas” 
(Fischer, 2004:2).   Other recommendations are 
that older workers stay current with industry 
developments, keep skills sharp and stay in touch 
with professional contacts.  (Fischer, 2004). 
Garner your Strengths   
Researchers have found evidence to support 
that older workers have a stronger work ethic and 
are more willing to do thought in-depth research.  
(Fischer, 2004:2).   Likewise, “older workers tend 
to ‘be less self-absorbed and more self-
aware’…they usually have a better understanding 
of their skills and limitations, and of what’s 
important in life” (Fischer, 2004:2).  Older 
workers are often “at a point in their lives at which 
they’re not interested in being a CEO or in trying 
to cross another bridge too far.  They know what 
they do best” (Bonney, Mar 22, 2004). 
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
In an article published by the United Nations 
Department of Public Information in response the 
2002 World Assembly on Aging II, the policy 
response was:  “The vitality of our societies will 
increasingly depend on active participation by 
older persons.  It is therefore imperative that we 
foster economic and social conditions that will 
allow people of all ages to remain integrated into 
society.  An essential challenge is to promote a 
culture that values the experience and knowledge 
that come with age” (Annan, March,  2002:5)    he 
International Labour Organization (ILO) is also 
dedicated to ensuring decent work or retirement 
for older people. (Annan, March, 2002:6).  The 
ILO calls upon states:  “…to adopt national 
policies to promote equality of opportunity and 
treatment for workers, whatever their age; and to 
take measures to prevent discrimination against 
older workers, particularly with regard to: access 
to vocational guidance and placement services; 
access to employment of their choice that takes 
into account their personal skills, experience and 
qualifications; access to vocational training, in 
particular; further training and retraining; and 
employment security” (Annan, March, 2002:6).   
On the issue of retirement, the ILO further 
recommends “that measure be taken to ensure that 
the transition from work to retirement is gradual, 
that retirement is voluntary, and that the age 
qualifying a person for a pension is flexible” 
(Annan, March, 2002:7).  The issue is 
fundamental, especially as rapidly aging 
workforces in the United States and other 
industrialized countries threaten to vastly increase 
the social costs of any barriers to older workers’ 
employment. (Johnson & Neumark, 1997; 
Neumark, March 2001). 
CONCLUSION 
The enactment of the ADEA has been 
critically important for the elimination of age 
restrictions in the hiring of older workers and 
mandatory retirement.  The ADEA has not been as 
powerful a deterrent against employment policies 
that, in fact, impact older workers negatively.  
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Such policies are not illegal under the ADEA as 
long as their basis is a “reasonable factor other 
than age.”   Moreover, the replacement of older 
workers for economic reasons has been upheld by 
the courts as “reasonable.”   
The societal gains in integrating an aging 
population into the workforce in meaningful ways 
far outweigh the costs to employers.  Alternative 
work arrangements that fairly compensate older 
workers for their contributions to the workforce 
serve not only to benefit individual employers, but 
also society in general as the public dole is not left 
to fill the economic void.  Researchers who study 
older populations have concluded that the limited 
diminishment in older persons is generally offset 
by gains in the areas of life experience, priority 
setting and leadership abilities.  Consequently, the 
vitality of the workforce depends on progressive 
human resource practices that promote equality 
and opportunity for workers regardless of age. 
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